Files
u-boot/boot/image-fit-sig.c
Ludwig Nussel ce98d46395 Remove confusing NULL from error message
If no signature could be verified and the loop terminates, the iterator
'noffset' has no meaningful value so name yields NULL.

Signed-off-by: Ludwig Nussel <ludwig.nussel@siemens.com>
2026-03-27 13:10:00 -06:00

701 lines
18 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013, Google Inc.
*/
#ifdef USE_HOSTCC
#include "mkimage.h"
#include <time.h>
#else
#include <log.h>
#include <malloc.h>
#include <asm/global_data.h>
DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
#endif /* !USE_HOSTCC*/
#include <fdt_region.h>
#include <image.h>
#include <u-boot/rsa.h>
#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
#define IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES 100
#define FIT_MAX_HASH_PATH_BUF 4096
/**
* fit_region_make_list() - Make a list of image regions
*
* Given a list of fdt_regions, create a list of image_regions. This is a
* simple conversion routine since the FDT and image code use different
* structures.
*
* @fit: FIT image
* @fdt_regions: Pointer to FDT regions
* @count: Number of FDT regions
* @region: Pointer to image regions, which must hold @count records. If
* region is NULL, then (except for an SPL build) the array will be
* allocated.
* @return: Pointer to image regions
*/
struct image_region *fit_region_make_list(const void *fit,
struct fdt_region *fdt_regions,
int count,
struct image_region *region)
{
int i;
debug("Hash regions:\n");
debug("%10s %10s\n", "Offset", "Size");
/*
* Use malloc() except in SPL (to save code size). In SPL the caller
* must allocate the array.
*/
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XPL_BUILD) && !region)
region = calloc(sizeof(*region), count);
if (!region)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
debug("%10x %10x\n", fdt_regions[i].offset,
fdt_regions[i].size);
region[i].data = fit + fdt_regions[i].offset;
region[i].size = fdt_regions[i].size;
}
return region;
}
static int fit_image_setup_verify(struct image_sign_info *info,
const void *fit, int noffset,
const void *key_blob, int required_keynode,
char **err_msgp)
{
const char *algo_name;
const char *padding_name;
if (fdt_totalsize(fit) > CONFIG_VAL(FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE)) {
*err_msgp = "Total size too large";
return 1;
}
if (fit_image_hash_get_algo(fit, noffset, &algo_name)) {
*err_msgp = "Can't get hash algo property";
return -1;
}
padding_name = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "padding", NULL);
if (!padding_name)
padding_name = RSA_DEFAULT_PADDING_NAME;
memset(info, '\0', sizeof(*info));
info->keyname = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, FIT_KEY_HINT, NULL);
info->fit = fit;
info->node_offset = noffset;
info->name = algo_name;
info->checksum = image_get_checksum_algo(algo_name);
info->crypto = image_get_crypto_algo(algo_name);
info->padding = image_get_padding_algo(padding_name);
info->fdt_blob = key_blob;
info->required_keynode = required_keynode;
printf("%s:%s", algo_name, info->keyname);
if (!info->checksum || !info->crypto) {
*err_msgp = "Unknown signature algorithm";
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int fit_image_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, const void *data,
size_t size, const void *key_blob, int required_keynode,
char **err_msgp)
{
struct image_sign_info info;
struct image_region region;
uint8_t *fit_value;
int fit_value_len;
*err_msgp = NULL;
if (fit_image_setup_verify(&info, fit, noffset, key_blob,
required_keynode, err_msgp))
return -1;
if (fit_image_hash_get_value(fit, noffset, &fit_value,
&fit_value_len)) {
*err_msgp = "Can't get hash value property";
return -1;
}
region.data = data;
region.size = size;
if (info.crypto->verify(&info, &region, 1, fit_value, fit_value_len)) {
*err_msgp = "Verification failed";
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int fit_image_verify_sig(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
const char *data, size_t size,
const void *key_blob, int key_offset)
{
int noffset;
char *err_msg = "";
int verified = 0;
int ret;
/* Process all hash subnodes of the component image node */
fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, fit, image_noffset) {
const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL);
/*
* We don't support this since libfdt considers names with the
* name root but different @ suffix to be equal
*/
if (strchr(name, '@')) {
err_msg = "Node name contains @";
goto error;
}
if (!strncmp(name, FIT_SIG_NODENAME,
strlen(FIT_SIG_NODENAME))) {
ret = fit_image_check_sig(fit, noffset, data, size,
key_blob, -1, &err_msg);
if (ret) {
puts("- ");
} else {
puts("+ ");
verified = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (noffset == -FDT_ERR_TRUNCATED || noffset == -FDT_ERR_BADSTRUCTURE) {
err_msg = "Corrupted or truncated tree";
goto error;
}
return verified ? 0 : -EPERM;
error:
printf(" error!\n%s for '%s' hash node in '%s' image node\n",
err_msg, fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL),
fit_get_name(fit, image_noffset, NULL));
return -1;
}
int fit_image_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
const char *data, size_t size,
const void *key_blob, int *no_sigsp)
{
int verify_count = 0;
int noffset;
int key_node;
#ifdef USE_HOSTCC
if (!key_blob)
return 0;
#endif
/* Work out what we need to verify */
*no_sigsp = 1;
key_node = fdt_subnode_offset(key_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
if (key_node < 0) {
debug("%s: No signature node found: %s\n", __func__,
fdt_strerror(key_node));
return 0;
}
fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, key_blob, key_node) {
const char *required;
int ret;
required = fdt_getprop(key_blob, noffset, FIT_KEY_REQUIRED,
NULL);
if (!required || strcmp(required, "image"))
continue;
ret = fit_image_verify_sig(fit, image_noffset, data, size,
key_blob, noffset);
if (ret) {
printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n",
fit_get_name(key_blob, noffset, NULL));
return ret;
}
verify_count++;
}
if (verify_count)
*no_sigsp = 0;
return 0;
}
/**
* fit_config_add_hash() - Add hash nodes for one image to the node list
*
* Adds the image path, all its hash-* subnode paths, and its cipher
* subnode path (if present) to the packed buffer.
*
* @fit: FIT blob
* @image_noffset: Image node offset (e.g. /images/kernel-1)
* @node_inc: Array of path pointers to fill
* @count: Pointer to current count (updated on return)
* @max_nodes: Maximum entries in @node_inc
* @buf: Buffer for packed path strings
* @buf_used: Pointer to bytes used in @buf (updated on return)
* @buf_len: Total size of @buf
* Return: 0 on success, -ve on error
*/
static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
char **node_inc, int *count, int max_nodes,
char *buf, int *buf_used, int buf_len)
{
int noffset, hash_count, ret, len;
if (*count >= max_nodes)
return -ENOSPC;
ret = fdt_get_path(fit, image_noffset, buf + *buf_used,
buf_len - *buf_used);
if (ret < 0)
return -ENOENT;
len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
*buf_used += len;
/* Add all this image's hash subnodes */
hash_count = 0;
for (noffset = fdt_first_subnode(fit, image_noffset);
noffset >= 0;
noffset = fdt_next_subnode(fit, noffset)) {
const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL);
if (strncmp(name, FIT_HASH_NODENAME,
strlen(FIT_HASH_NODENAME)))
continue;
if (*count >= max_nodes)
return -ENOSPC;
ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used,
buf_len - *buf_used);
if (ret < 0)
return -ENOENT;
len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
*buf_used += len;
hash_count++;
}
if (!hash_count) {
printf("No hash nodes in image '%s'\n",
fdt_get_name(fit, image_noffset, NULL));
return -ENOMSG;
}
/* Add this image's cipher node if present */
noffset = fdt_subnode_offset(fit, image_noffset, FIT_CIPHER_NODENAME);
if (noffset != -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
if (noffset < 0)
return -EIO;
if (*count >= max_nodes)
return -ENOSPC;
ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used,
buf_len - *buf_used);
if (ret < 0)
return -ENOENT;
len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
*buf_used += len;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* fit_config_get_hash_list() - Build the list of nodes to hash
*
* Works through every image referenced by the configuration and collects the
* node paths: root + config + all referenced images with their hash and
* cipher subnodes.
*
* Properties known not to be image references (description, compatible,
* default, load-only) are skipped, so any new image type is covered by default.
*
* @fit: FIT blob
* @conf_noffset: Configuration node offset
* @node_inc: Array to fill with path string pointers
* @max_nodes: Size of @node_inc array
* @buf: Buffer for packed null-terminated path strings
* @buf_len: Size of @buf
* Return: number of entries in @node_inc, or -ve on error
*/
static int fit_config_get_hash_list(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
char **node_inc, int max_nodes,
char *buf, int buf_len)
{
const char *conf_name;
int image_count;
int prop_offset;
int used = 0;
int count = 0;
int ret, len;
conf_name = fit_get_name(fit, conf_noffset, NULL);
/* Always include the root node and the configuration node */
if (max_nodes < 2)
return -ENOSPC;
len = 2; /* "/" + nul */
if (len > buf_len)
return -ENOSPC;
strcpy(buf, "/");
node_inc[count++] = buf;
used += len;
len = snprintf(buf + used, buf_len - used, "%s/%s", FIT_CONFS_PATH,
conf_name) + 1;
if (used + len > buf_len)
return -ENOSPC;
node_inc[count++] = buf + used;
used += len;
/* Process each image referenced by the config */
image_count = 0;
fdt_for_each_property_offset(prop_offset, fit, conf_noffset) {
const char *prop_name;
int img_count, i;
fdt_getprop_by_offset(fit, prop_offset, &prop_name, NULL);
if (!prop_name)
continue;
/* Skip properties that are not image references */
if (!strcmp(prop_name, FIT_DESC_PROP) ||
!strcmp(prop_name, FIT_COMPAT_PROP) ||
!strcmp(prop_name, FIT_DEFAULT_PROP))
continue;
img_count = fdt_stringlist_count(fit, conf_noffset, prop_name);
for (i = 0; i < img_count; i++) {
int noffset;
noffset = fit_conf_get_prop_node_index(fit,
conf_noffset,
prop_name, i);
if (noffset < 0)
continue;
ret = fit_config_add_hash(fit, noffset, node_inc,
&count, max_nodes, buf, &used,
buf_len);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
image_count++;
}
}
if (!image_count) {
printf("No images in config '%s'\n", conf_name);
return -ENOMSG;
}
return count;
}
/**
* fit_config_check_sig() - Check the signature of a config
*
* Here we are looking at a particular signature that needs verification (here
* signature-1):
*
* configurations {
* default = "conf-1";
* conf-1 {
* kernel = "kernel-1";
* fdt = "fdt-1";
* signature-1 {
* algo = "sha1,rsa2048";
* value = <...conf 1 signature...>;
* };
* };
*
* @fit: FIT to check
* @noffset: Offset of the signature node being checked (e.g.
* /configurations/conf-1/signature-1)
* @conf_noffset: Offset of configuration node (e.g. /configurations/conf-1)
* @key_blob: Blob containing the keys to check against
* @required_keynode: Offset in @key_blob of the required key node,
* if any. If this is given, then the configuration wil not
* pass verification unless that key is used. If this is
* -1 then any signature will do.
* @err_msgp: In the event of an error, this will be pointed to a
* help error string to display to the user.
* Return: 0 if all verified ok, <0 on error
*/
static int fit_config_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, int conf_noffset,
const void *key_blob, int required_keynode,
char **err_msgp)
{
static char * const exc_prop[] = {
FIT_DATA_PROP,
FIT_DATA_SIZE_PROP,
FIT_DATA_POSITION_PROP,
FIT_DATA_OFFSET_PROP,
};
char *node_inc[IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES];
char hash_buf[FIT_MAX_HASH_PATH_BUF];
struct image_sign_info info;
const uint32_t *strings;
uint8_t *fit_value;
int fit_value_len;
int max_regions;
char path[200];
int count;
debug("%s: fdt=%p, conf='%s', sig='%s'\n", __func__, key_blob,
fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL),
fit_get_name(key_blob, required_keynode, NULL));
*err_msgp = NULL;
if (fit_image_setup_verify(&info, fit, noffset, key_blob,
required_keynode, err_msgp))
return -1;
if (fit_image_hash_get_value(fit, noffset, &fit_value,
&fit_value_len)) {
*err_msgp = "Can't get hash value property";
return -1;
}
/* Build the node list from the config, ignoring hashed-nodes */
count = fit_config_get_hash_list(fit, conf_noffset,
node_inc, IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES,
hash_buf, sizeof(hash_buf));
if (count < 0) {
*err_msgp = "Failed to build hash node list";
return -1;
}
debug("Hash nodes (%d):\n", count);
for (int i = 0; i < count; ++i)
debug(" '%s'\n", node_inc[i]);
/*
* Each node can generate one region for each sub-node. Allow for
* 7 sub-nodes (hash-1, signature-1, etc.) and some extra.
*/
max_regions = 20 + count * 7;
struct fdt_region fdt_regions[max_regions];
/* Get a list of regions to hash */
count = fdt_find_regions(fit, node_inc, count,
exc_prop, ARRAY_SIZE(exc_prop),
fdt_regions, max_regions - 1,
path, sizeof(path), 0);
if (count < 0) {
*err_msgp = "Failed to hash configuration";
return -1;
}
if (count == 0) {
*err_msgp = "No data to hash";
return -1;
}
if (count >= max_regions - 1) {
*err_msgp = "Too many hash regions";
return -1;
}
/* Add the strings */
strings = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "hashed-strings", NULL);
if (strings) {
/*
* The strings region offset must be a static 0x0.
* This is set in tool/image-host.c
*/
fdt_regions[count].offset = fdt_off_dt_strings(fit);
fdt_regions[count].size = fdt32_to_cpu(strings[1]);
count++;
}
/* Allocate the region list on the stack */
struct image_region region[count];
fit_region_make_list(fit, fdt_regions, count, region);
if (info.crypto->verify(&info, region, count, fit_value,
fit_value_len)) {
*err_msgp = "Verification failed";
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* fit_config_verify_key() - Verify that a configuration is signed with a key
*
* Here we are looking at a particular configuration that needs verification:
*
* configurations {
* default = "conf-1";
* conf-1 {
* kernel = "kernel-1";
* fdt = "fdt-1";
* signature-1 {
* algo = "sha1,rsa2048";
* value = <...conf 1 signature...>;
* };
* };
*
* We must check each of the signature subnodes of conf-1. Hopefully one of them
* will match the key at key_offset.
*
* @fit: FIT to check
* @conf_noffset: Offset of the configuration node to check (e.g.
* /configurations/conf-1)
* @key_blob: Blob containing the keys to check against
* @key_offset: Offset of the key to check within @key_blob
* @return 0 if OK, -EPERM if any signatures did not verify, or the
* configuration node has an invalid name
*/
static int fit_config_verify_key(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
const void *key_blob, int key_offset)
{
int noffset;
char *err_msg = "No 'signature' subnode found";
int verified = 0;
int ret;
/* Process all hash subnodes of the component conf node */
fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, fit, conf_noffset) {
const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL);
if (!strncmp(name, FIT_SIG_NODENAME,
strlen(FIT_SIG_NODENAME))) {
ret = fit_config_check_sig(fit, noffset, conf_noffset,
key_blob, key_offset,
&err_msg);
if (ret) {
puts("- ");
} else {
puts("+ ");
verified = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (noffset == -FDT_ERR_TRUNCATED || noffset == -FDT_ERR_BADSTRUCTURE) {
err_msg = "Corrupted or truncated tree";
goto error;
}
if (verified)
return 0;
error:
printf(" error!\n%s for '%s' config node\n",
err_msg, fit_get_name(fit, conf_noffset, NULL));
return -EPERM;
}
/**
* fit_config_verify_required_keys() - verify any required signatures for config
*
* This looks through all the signatures we expect and verifies that at least
* all the required ones are valid signatures for the configuration
*
* @fit: FIT to check
* @conf_noffset: Offset of the configuration node to check (e.g.
* /configurations/conf-1)
* @key_blob: Blob containing the keys to check against
* @return 0 if OK, -EPERM if any signatures did not verify, or the
* configuration node has an invalid name
*/
static int fit_config_verify_required_keys(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
const void *key_blob)
{
const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, conf_noffset, NULL);
int noffset;
int key_node;
int verified = 0;
int reqd_sigs = 0;
bool reqd_policy_all = true;
const char *reqd_mode;
#ifdef USE_HOSTCC
if (!key_blob)
return 0;
#endif
/*
* We don't support this since libfdt considers names with the
* name root but different @ suffix to be equal
*/
if (strchr(name, '@')) {
printf("Configuration node '%s' contains '@'\n", name);
return -EPERM;
}
/* Work out what we need to verify */
key_node = fdt_subnode_offset(key_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
if (key_node < 0) {
debug("%s: No signature node found: %s\n", __func__,
fdt_strerror(key_node));
return 0;
}
/* Get required-mode policy property from DTB */
reqd_mode = fdt_getprop(key_blob, key_node, "required-mode", NULL);
if (reqd_mode && !strcmp(reqd_mode, "any"))
reqd_policy_all = false;
debug("%s: required-mode policy set to '%s'\n", __func__,
reqd_policy_all ? "all" : "any");
/*
* The algorithm here is a little convoluted due to how we want it to
* work. Here we work through each of the signature nodes in the
* public-key area. These are in the U-Boot control devicetree. Each
* node was created by signing a configuration, so we check if it is
* 'required' and if so, request that it be verified.
*/
fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, key_blob, key_node) {
const char *required;
int ret;
required = fdt_getprop(key_blob, noffset, FIT_KEY_REQUIRED,
NULL);
if (!required || strcmp(required, "conf"))
continue;
reqd_sigs++;
ret = fit_config_verify_key(fit, conf_noffset, key_blob,
noffset);
if (ret) {
if (reqd_policy_all) {
printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n",
fit_get_name(key_blob, noffset, NULL));
return ret;
}
} else {
verified++;
if (!reqd_policy_all)
break;
}
}
if (reqd_sigs && !verified) {
printf("Failed to verify 'any' of the required signature(s)\n");
return -EPERM;
}
return 0;
}
int fit_config_verify(const void *fit, int conf_noffset)
{
return fit_config_verify_required_keys(fit, conf_noffset,
gd_fdt_blob());
}