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doc: ti: k3: Correct spelling mistakes and improve clarity
Few cosmetic fixes for clarity and spelling mistakes. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Humphreys <j-humphreys@ti.com> Reviewed-by: Mattijs Korpershoek <mkorpershoek@baylibre.com>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Tom Rini
parent
cedad0670e
commit
bf240862a8
@@ -51,14 +51,14 @@ For all K3 SoCs the first core started will be inside the Security
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Management Subsystem (SMS) which will secure the device and start a core
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in the wakeup domain to run the ROM code. ROM will then initialize the
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boot media needed to load the binaries packaged inside `tiboot3.bin`,
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including a 32bit U-Boot SPL, (called the wakup SPL) that ROM will jump
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including a 32bit U-Boot SPL, (called the wakeup SPL) that ROM will jump
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to after it has finished loading everything into internal SRAM.
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.. image:: img/boot_flow_01.svg
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:alt: Boot flow up to wakeup domain SPL
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The wakeup SPL, running on a wakeup domain core, will initialize DDR and
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any peripherals needed load the larger binaries inside the `tispl.bin`
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any peripherals needed to load the larger binaries inside the `tispl.bin`
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into DDR. Once loaded the wakeup SPL will start one of the 'big'
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application cores inside the main domain to initialize the main domain,
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starting with Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A), before moving on to start
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@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ essentially 4 unique but very similar flows:
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* Combined binary with a split firmware: (eg: AM62)
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For devices that utilize the split binary approach, ROM is not capable
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of loading the firmware into the SoC requiring the wakeup domain's
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of loading the firmware into the SoC, requiring the wakeup domain's
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U-Boot SPL to load the firmware.
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Devices with a split firmware will have two firmwares loaded into the
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@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ K3 HS-SE (High Security - Security Enforced) devices enforce an
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authenticated boot flow for secure boot. HS-FS (High Security - Field
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Securable) is the state of a K3 device before it has been eFused with
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customer security keys. In the HS-FS state the authentication still can
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function as in HS-SE but as there are no customer keys to verify the
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signatures against the authentication will pass for certificates signed
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function as in HS-SE, but as there are no customer keys to verify the
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signatures against, the authentication will pass for certificates signed
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with any key.
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Chain of trust
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