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If no signature could be verified and the loop terminates, the iterator 'noffset' has no meaningful value so name yields NULL. Signed-off-by: Ludwig Nussel <ludwig.nussel@siemens.com>
701 lines
18 KiB
C
701 lines
18 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2013, Google Inc.
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*/
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#ifdef USE_HOSTCC
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#include "mkimage.h"
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#include <time.h>
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#else
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#include <log.h>
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#include <malloc.h>
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#include <asm/global_data.h>
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DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
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#endif /* !USE_HOSTCC*/
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#include <fdt_region.h>
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#include <image.h>
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#include <u-boot/rsa.h>
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#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
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#define IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES 100
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#define FIT_MAX_HASH_PATH_BUF 4096
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/**
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* fit_region_make_list() - Make a list of image regions
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*
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* Given a list of fdt_regions, create a list of image_regions. This is a
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* simple conversion routine since the FDT and image code use different
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* structures.
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*
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* @fit: FIT image
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* @fdt_regions: Pointer to FDT regions
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* @count: Number of FDT regions
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* @region: Pointer to image regions, which must hold @count records. If
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* region is NULL, then (except for an SPL build) the array will be
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* allocated.
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* @return: Pointer to image regions
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*/
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struct image_region *fit_region_make_list(const void *fit,
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struct fdt_region *fdt_regions,
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int count,
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struct image_region *region)
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{
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int i;
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debug("Hash regions:\n");
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debug("%10s %10s\n", "Offset", "Size");
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/*
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* Use malloc() except in SPL (to save code size). In SPL the caller
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* must allocate the array.
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*/
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if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XPL_BUILD) && !region)
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region = calloc(sizeof(*region), count);
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if (!region)
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return NULL;
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for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
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debug("%10x %10x\n", fdt_regions[i].offset,
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fdt_regions[i].size);
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region[i].data = fit + fdt_regions[i].offset;
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region[i].size = fdt_regions[i].size;
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}
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return region;
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}
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static int fit_image_setup_verify(struct image_sign_info *info,
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const void *fit, int noffset,
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const void *key_blob, int required_keynode,
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char **err_msgp)
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{
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const char *algo_name;
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const char *padding_name;
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if (fdt_totalsize(fit) > CONFIG_VAL(FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE)) {
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*err_msgp = "Total size too large";
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return 1;
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}
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if (fit_image_hash_get_algo(fit, noffset, &algo_name)) {
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*err_msgp = "Can't get hash algo property";
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return -1;
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}
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padding_name = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "padding", NULL);
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if (!padding_name)
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padding_name = RSA_DEFAULT_PADDING_NAME;
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memset(info, '\0', sizeof(*info));
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info->keyname = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, FIT_KEY_HINT, NULL);
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info->fit = fit;
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info->node_offset = noffset;
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info->name = algo_name;
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info->checksum = image_get_checksum_algo(algo_name);
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info->crypto = image_get_crypto_algo(algo_name);
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info->padding = image_get_padding_algo(padding_name);
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info->fdt_blob = key_blob;
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info->required_keynode = required_keynode;
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printf("%s:%s", algo_name, info->keyname);
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if (!info->checksum || !info->crypto) {
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*err_msgp = "Unknown signature algorithm";
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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int fit_image_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, const void *data,
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size_t size, const void *key_blob, int required_keynode,
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char **err_msgp)
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{
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struct image_sign_info info;
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struct image_region region;
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uint8_t *fit_value;
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int fit_value_len;
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*err_msgp = NULL;
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if (fit_image_setup_verify(&info, fit, noffset, key_blob,
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required_keynode, err_msgp))
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return -1;
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if (fit_image_hash_get_value(fit, noffset, &fit_value,
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&fit_value_len)) {
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*err_msgp = "Can't get hash value property";
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return -1;
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}
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region.data = data;
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region.size = size;
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if (info.crypto->verify(&info, ®ion, 1, fit_value, fit_value_len)) {
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*err_msgp = "Verification failed";
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int fit_image_verify_sig(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
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const char *data, size_t size,
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const void *key_blob, int key_offset)
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{
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int noffset;
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char *err_msg = "";
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int verified = 0;
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int ret;
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/* Process all hash subnodes of the component image node */
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fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, fit, image_noffset) {
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const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL);
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/*
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* We don't support this since libfdt considers names with the
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* name root but different @ suffix to be equal
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*/
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if (strchr(name, '@')) {
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err_msg = "Node name contains @";
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goto error;
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}
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if (!strncmp(name, FIT_SIG_NODENAME,
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strlen(FIT_SIG_NODENAME))) {
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ret = fit_image_check_sig(fit, noffset, data, size,
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key_blob, -1, &err_msg);
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if (ret) {
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puts("- ");
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} else {
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puts("+ ");
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verified = 1;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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if (noffset == -FDT_ERR_TRUNCATED || noffset == -FDT_ERR_BADSTRUCTURE) {
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err_msg = "Corrupted or truncated tree";
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goto error;
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}
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return verified ? 0 : -EPERM;
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error:
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printf(" error!\n%s for '%s' hash node in '%s' image node\n",
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err_msg, fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL),
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fit_get_name(fit, image_noffset, NULL));
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return -1;
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}
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int fit_image_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
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const char *data, size_t size,
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const void *key_blob, int *no_sigsp)
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{
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int verify_count = 0;
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int noffset;
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int key_node;
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#ifdef USE_HOSTCC
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if (!key_blob)
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return 0;
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#endif
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/* Work out what we need to verify */
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*no_sigsp = 1;
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key_node = fdt_subnode_offset(key_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
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if (key_node < 0) {
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debug("%s: No signature node found: %s\n", __func__,
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fdt_strerror(key_node));
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return 0;
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}
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fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, key_blob, key_node) {
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const char *required;
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int ret;
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required = fdt_getprop(key_blob, noffset, FIT_KEY_REQUIRED,
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NULL);
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if (!required || strcmp(required, "image"))
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continue;
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ret = fit_image_verify_sig(fit, image_noffset, data, size,
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key_blob, noffset);
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if (ret) {
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printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n",
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fit_get_name(key_blob, noffset, NULL));
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return ret;
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}
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verify_count++;
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}
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if (verify_count)
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*no_sigsp = 0;
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* fit_config_add_hash() - Add hash nodes for one image to the node list
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*
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* Adds the image path, all its hash-* subnode paths, and its cipher
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* subnode path (if present) to the packed buffer.
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*
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* @fit: FIT blob
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* @image_noffset: Image node offset (e.g. /images/kernel-1)
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* @node_inc: Array of path pointers to fill
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* @count: Pointer to current count (updated on return)
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* @max_nodes: Maximum entries in @node_inc
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* @buf: Buffer for packed path strings
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* @buf_used: Pointer to bytes used in @buf (updated on return)
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* @buf_len: Total size of @buf
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* Return: 0 on success, -ve on error
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*/
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static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
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char **node_inc, int *count, int max_nodes,
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char *buf, int *buf_used, int buf_len)
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{
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int noffset, hash_count, ret, len;
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if (*count >= max_nodes)
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return -ENOSPC;
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ret = fdt_get_path(fit, image_noffset, buf + *buf_used,
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buf_len - *buf_used);
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if (ret < 0)
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return -ENOENT;
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len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
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node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
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*buf_used += len;
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/* Add all this image's hash subnodes */
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hash_count = 0;
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for (noffset = fdt_first_subnode(fit, image_noffset);
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noffset >= 0;
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noffset = fdt_next_subnode(fit, noffset)) {
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const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL);
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if (strncmp(name, FIT_HASH_NODENAME,
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strlen(FIT_HASH_NODENAME)))
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continue;
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if (*count >= max_nodes)
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return -ENOSPC;
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ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used,
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buf_len - *buf_used);
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if (ret < 0)
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return -ENOENT;
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len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
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node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
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*buf_used += len;
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hash_count++;
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}
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if (!hash_count) {
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printf("No hash nodes in image '%s'\n",
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fdt_get_name(fit, image_noffset, NULL));
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return -ENOMSG;
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}
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/* Add this image's cipher node if present */
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noffset = fdt_subnode_offset(fit, image_noffset, FIT_CIPHER_NODENAME);
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if (noffset != -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
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if (noffset < 0)
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return -EIO;
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if (*count >= max_nodes)
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return -ENOSPC;
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ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used,
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buf_len - *buf_used);
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if (ret < 0)
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return -ENOENT;
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len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
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node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
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*buf_used += len;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* fit_config_get_hash_list() - Build the list of nodes to hash
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*
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* Works through every image referenced by the configuration and collects the
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* node paths: root + config + all referenced images with their hash and
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* cipher subnodes.
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*
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* Properties known not to be image references (description, compatible,
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* default, load-only) are skipped, so any new image type is covered by default.
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*
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* @fit: FIT blob
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* @conf_noffset: Configuration node offset
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* @node_inc: Array to fill with path string pointers
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* @max_nodes: Size of @node_inc array
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* @buf: Buffer for packed null-terminated path strings
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* @buf_len: Size of @buf
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* Return: number of entries in @node_inc, or -ve on error
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*/
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static int fit_config_get_hash_list(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
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char **node_inc, int max_nodes,
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char *buf, int buf_len)
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{
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const char *conf_name;
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int image_count;
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int prop_offset;
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int used = 0;
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int count = 0;
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int ret, len;
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conf_name = fit_get_name(fit, conf_noffset, NULL);
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/* Always include the root node and the configuration node */
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if (max_nodes < 2)
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return -ENOSPC;
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len = 2; /* "/" + nul */
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if (len > buf_len)
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return -ENOSPC;
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strcpy(buf, "/");
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node_inc[count++] = buf;
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used += len;
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len = snprintf(buf + used, buf_len - used, "%s/%s", FIT_CONFS_PATH,
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conf_name) + 1;
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if (used + len > buf_len)
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return -ENOSPC;
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node_inc[count++] = buf + used;
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used += len;
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/* Process each image referenced by the config */
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image_count = 0;
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fdt_for_each_property_offset(prop_offset, fit, conf_noffset) {
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const char *prop_name;
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int img_count, i;
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fdt_getprop_by_offset(fit, prop_offset, &prop_name, NULL);
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if (!prop_name)
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continue;
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/* Skip properties that are not image references */
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if (!strcmp(prop_name, FIT_DESC_PROP) ||
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!strcmp(prop_name, FIT_COMPAT_PROP) ||
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!strcmp(prop_name, FIT_DEFAULT_PROP))
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continue;
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img_count = fdt_stringlist_count(fit, conf_noffset, prop_name);
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for (i = 0; i < img_count; i++) {
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int noffset;
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noffset = fit_conf_get_prop_node_index(fit,
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conf_noffset,
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prop_name, i);
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if (noffset < 0)
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continue;
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ret = fit_config_add_hash(fit, noffset, node_inc,
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&count, max_nodes, buf, &used,
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buf_len);
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
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image_count++;
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}
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}
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if (!image_count) {
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printf("No images in config '%s'\n", conf_name);
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return -ENOMSG;
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}
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return count;
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}
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/**
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* fit_config_check_sig() - Check the signature of a config
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*
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* Here we are looking at a particular signature that needs verification (here
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* signature-1):
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*
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* configurations {
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* default = "conf-1";
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* conf-1 {
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* kernel = "kernel-1";
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* fdt = "fdt-1";
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* signature-1 {
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* algo = "sha1,rsa2048";
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* value = <...conf 1 signature...>;
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* };
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* };
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*
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* @fit: FIT to check
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* @noffset: Offset of the signature node being checked (e.g.
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* /configurations/conf-1/signature-1)
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* @conf_noffset: Offset of configuration node (e.g. /configurations/conf-1)
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* @key_blob: Blob containing the keys to check against
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* @required_keynode: Offset in @key_blob of the required key node,
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* if any. If this is given, then the configuration wil not
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* pass verification unless that key is used. If this is
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* -1 then any signature will do.
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* @err_msgp: In the event of an error, this will be pointed to a
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* help error string to display to the user.
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* Return: 0 if all verified ok, <0 on error
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*/
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static int fit_config_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, int conf_noffset,
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const void *key_blob, int required_keynode,
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char **err_msgp)
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{
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static char * const exc_prop[] = {
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FIT_DATA_PROP,
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FIT_DATA_SIZE_PROP,
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FIT_DATA_POSITION_PROP,
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FIT_DATA_OFFSET_PROP,
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};
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char *node_inc[IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES];
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char hash_buf[FIT_MAX_HASH_PATH_BUF];
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struct image_sign_info info;
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const uint32_t *strings;
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uint8_t *fit_value;
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int fit_value_len;
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int max_regions;
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char path[200];
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int count;
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debug("%s: fdt=%p, conf='%s', sig='%s'\n", __func__, key_blob,
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fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL),
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fit_get_name(key_blob, required_keynode, NULL));
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*err_msgp = NULL;
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if (fit_image_setup_verify(&info, fit, noffset, key_blob,
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required_keynode, err_msgp))
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return -1;
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if (fit_image_hash_get_value(fit, noffset, &fit_value,
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&fit_value_len)) {
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*err_msgp = "Can't get hash value property";
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return -1;
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}
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/* Build the node list from the config, ignoring hashed-nodes */
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count = fit_config_get_hash_list(fit, conf_noffset,
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node_inc, IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES,
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hash_buf, sizeof(hash_buf));
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if (count < 0) {
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*err_msgp = "Failed to build hash node list";
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return -1;
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}
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debug("Hash nodes (%d):\n", count);
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for (int i = 0; i < count; ++i)
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debug(" '%s'\n", node_inc[i]);
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/*
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* Each node can generate one region for each sub-node. Allow for
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* 7 sub-nodes (hash-1, signature-1, etc.) and some extra.
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*/
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max_regions = 20 + count * 7;
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struct fdt_region fdt_regions[max_regions];
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/* Get a list of regions to hash */
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count = fdt_find_regions(fit, node_inc, count,
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exc_prop, ARRAY_SIZE(exc_prop),
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fdt_regions, max_regions - 1,
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path, sizeof(path), 0);
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if (count < 0) {
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*err_msgp = "Failed to hash configuration";
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return -1;
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}
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if (count == 0) {
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*err_msgp = "No data to hash";
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (count >= max_regions - 1) {
|
|
*err_msgp = "Too many hash regions";
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add the strings */
|
|
strings = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "hashed-strings", NULL);
|
|
if (strings) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The strings region offset must be a static 0x0.
|
|
* This is set in tool/image-host.c
|
|
*/
|
|
fdt_regions[count].offset = fdt_off_dt_strings(fit);
|
|
fdt_regions[count].size = fdt32_to_cpu(strings[1]);
|
|
count++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate the region list on the stack */
|
|
struct image_region region[count];
|
|
|
|
fit_region_make_list(fit, fdt_regions, count, region);
|
|
if (info.crypto->verify(&info, region, count, fit_value,
|
|
fit_value_len)) {
|
|
*err_msgp = "Verification failed";
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* fit_config_verify_key() - Verify that a configuration is signed with a key
|
|
*
|
|
* Here we are looking at a particular configuration that needs verification:
|
|
*
|
|
* configurations {
|
|
* default = "conf-1";
|
|
* conf-1 {
|
|
* kernel = "kernel-1";
|
|
* fdt = "fdt-1";
|
|
* signature-1 {
|
|
* algo = "sha1,rsa2048";
|
|
* value = <...conf 1 signature...>;
|
|
* };
|
|
* };
|
|
*
|
|
* We must check each of the signature subnodes of conf-1. Hopefully one of them
|
|
* will match the key at key_offset.
|
|
*
|
|
* @fit: FIT to check
|
|
* @conf_noffset: Offset of the configuration node to check (e.g.
|
|
* /configurations/conf-1)
|
|
* @key_blob: Blob containing the keys to check against
|
|
* @key_offset: Offset of the key to check within @key_blob
|
|
* @return 0 if OK, -EPERM if any signatures did not verify, or the
|
|
* configuration node has an invalid name
|
|
*/
|
|
static int fit_config_verify_key(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
|
|
const void *key_blob, int key_offset)
|
|
{
|
|
int noffset;
|
|
char *err_msg = "No 'signature' subnode found";
|
|
int verified = 0;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Process all hash subnodes of the component conf node */
|
|
fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, fit, conf_noffset) {
|
|
const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(name, FIT_SIG_NODENAME,
|
|
strlen(FIT_SIG_NODENAME))) {
|
|
ret = fit_config_check_sig(fit, noffset, conf_noffset,
|
|
key_blob, key_offset,
|
|
&err_msg);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
puts("- ");
|
|
} else {
|
|
puts("+ ");
|
|
verified = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (noffset == -FDT_ERR_TRUNCATED || noffset == -FDT_ERR_BADSTRUCTURE) {
|
|
err_msg = "Corrupted or truncated tree";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (verified)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
printf(" error!\n%s for '%s' config node\n",
|
|
err_msg, fit_get_name(fit, conf_noffset, NULL));
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* fit_config_verify_required_keys() - verify any required signatures for config
|
|
*
|
|
* This looks through all the signatures we expect and verifies that at least
|
|
* all the required ones are valid signatures for the configuration
|
|
*
|
|
* @fit: FIT to check
|
|
* @conf_noffset: Offset of the configuration node to check (e.g.
|
|
* /configurations/conf-1)
|
|
* @key_blob: Blob containing the keys to check against
|
|
* @return 0 if OK, -EPERM if any signatures did not verify, or the
|
|
* configuration node has an invalid name
|
|
*/
|
|
static int fit_config_verify_required_keys(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
|
|
const void *key_blob)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, conf_noffset, NULL);
|
|
int noffset;
|
|
int key_node;
|
|
int verified = 0;
|
|
int reqd_sigs = 0;
|
|
bool reqd_policy_all = true;
|
|
const char *reqd_mode;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_HOSTCC
|
|
if (!key_blob)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We don't support this since libfdt considers names with the
|
|
* name root but different @ suffix to be equal
|
|
*/
|
|
if (strchr(name, '@')) {
|
|
printf("Configuration node '%s' contains '@'\n", name);
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Work out what we need to verify */
|
|
key_node = fdt_subnode_offset(key_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
|
|
if (key_node < 0) {
|
|
debug("%s: No signature node found: %s\n", __func__,
|
|
fdt_strerror(key_node));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get required-mode policy property from DTB */
|
|
reqd_mode = fdt_getprop(key_blob, key_node, "required-mode", NULL);
|
|
if (reqd_mode && !strcmp(reqd_mode, "any"))
|
|
reqd_policy_all = false;
|
|
|
|
debug("%s: required-mode policy set to '%s'\n", __func__,
|
|
reqd_policy_all ? "all" : "any");
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The algorithm here is a little convoluted due to how we want it to
|
|
* work. Here we work through each of the signature nodes in the
|
|
* public-key area. These are in the U-Boot control devicetree. Each
|
|
* node was created by signing a configuration, so we check if it is
|
|
* 'required' and if so, request that it be verified.
|
|
*/
|
|
fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, key_blob, key_node) {
|
|
const char *required;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
required = fdt_getprop(key_blob, noffset, FIT_KEY_REQUIRED,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
if (!required || strcmp(required, "conf"))
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
reqd_sigs++;
|
|
|
|
ret = fit_config_verify_key(fit, conf_noffset, key_blob,
|
|
noffset);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
if (reqd_policy_all) {
|
|
printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n",
|
|
fit_get_name(key_blob, noffset, NULL));
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
verified++;
|
|
if (!reqd_policy_all)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (reqd_sigs && !verified) {
|
|
printf("Failed to verify 'any' of the required signature(s)\n");
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int fit_config_verify(const void *fit, int conf_noffset)
|
|
{
|
|
return fit_config_verify_required_keys(fit, conf_noffset,
|
|
gd_fdt_blob());
|
|
}
|